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5 Capital accwnulation 
Breaking the dualism of 'economics' 
and 'politics' 
Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler 
Political economy attempts to tie together the quest for power with the pursuit of 
plenty. But things which need to be linked are assumed separate to begin with, 
and indeed, the distinction between power and well-being is a fundamental tenet 
of modern social thinking. The origin of this duality goes back to the emergence 
of industrial capitalism during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Classical 
political economists, siding with the rising bourgeoisie against the ancien regime, 
promoted a novel idea: the 'free market'. Their purpose was to separate civil 
society from the institutions of family, community and state in which it was 
previously embedded (polanyi 1944). According to Adam Smith, free markets 
operated as an 'invisible hand', a mechanism which he claimed automatically 
allocated resources to their most efficient use. But in order to be effective, the 
invisible hand had to be left alone. The call for laissez-faire was therefore a call for 
the depoliticization of production and well-being. 
And so from Smith onward, it became increasingly customary to separate 
human actions into two distinct spheres, 'vertical' and 'horizontal'. The vertical 
dimension revolves around power, authority, command, manipulation and disso­
nance. Academically, it belongs to the realm of politics. The horizontal axis 
centres around well-being, free choice, exchange and equilibrium - the academic 
preoccupation of economists. The consequence of this duality was to make 
modern political economy an impossible patchwork: its practitioners try to re­
marry power and well-being, but having accepted them as distinct- spheres of 
activity to begin with, the marriage is inherently shaky. 
A principal casualty of this separation is the theory of capital. Academic 
departmentalization placed it fIrmly in the hands of economists, leaving political 
scientists, sociologists and anthropologists with practically no say. The result was 
emphasis on material considerations and all but complete neglect of power. This 
did, not clear the water, though, for despite having monopolized the concept of 
capital, economists were still unable to decide what it meant. While all agreed 
that capital was monetary wealth, figuring out what made it grow proved much 
harder. In general, economists tried to make the accumulation of monetary 
wealth a consequence of production, but as the latter grew in complexity the link 
became difficult to pin down. Moreover, having dispensed with the study of 
power to begin with, economists were unable to use it as a possible solution for 
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their riddle. There were exceptions, of course, the most noted of which was Karl 
Marx. As a politic;! economist, Marx tried from the very outset to integrate, not 
separate power and production. Yet for all its insight, his synthesis remained 
vulnerable. He insisted on building the concept of capital squarely on the 
productive labour process, which in turn meant that the broader institutions of 
power, however prominent in his historical narratives, remained secondary in his 
ana!JItical abstractions. 
Although there is an undeniable connection between capital and production, 
the link is neither simple, nor sufficient as a basis for a theory of capital. Some 
Marxists, particularly those associated with the social structures of accumulation 
and regulation schools, have attempted to augment the material concept of 
capital with cultural and political 'variables' (for instance, Aglietta 1 979, Katz et 
at. 1994, and Dunford, Chapter 10 in this volume). This, though, does not get to 
the root of the problem. The solution is not to 'add' power, but to integrate it 
into the very definition of capital. Capital must be understood as incorporating 
both power and productivity. 
Such broader defInition could prove important for international political 
economy. Specifically, it can help us re-interpret state and capital not as separate 
entities standing against each other, but rather as partly overlapping institutions 
with intimately intertwined histories. From this perspective, the gradual ascent of 
global capitalism reflects the changing relationship - both contradictory and 
reinforcing - between state power anchored in sovereignty and capitalist power 
rooted in ownership. 
This chapter paints the background for such a proposal, outlining the main 
problems of capital theory, key issues which need to be resolved, and the way in 
which an alternative concept of capital may affect the future evolution of IPE. 
Briefly, existing theories of capital can be classified into three groups, based on 
their relationship to production. The neoclassical paradigm makes output a 
function of factor inputs (the amount of the different factors of production -
labour, raw materials and capital goods - used to produce that output). Capital, 
perceived as one of these factors, is counted in its own technical units. Marxists 
view production as a socio-material transformation in which capital changes its 
skin from money, to commodities, to more money. The engine of this transfor­
mation is the labour process, in which living labour power is converted into 'dead 
labour' embedded in commodities. Capital, growing directly from this process, is 
measured in labour time. For the institutionalists, production is a complex societal 
process, whose qualitative intricacies cannot be easily deciphered, let alone quan­
tifIed. In this latter framework, capital is neither a productive input nor a 
material output, but rather a symbolic pecuniary crystallization of the power 
controlling the process. Seen in that way, capital can be measured only in differ­
ential terms, relative to other capitals. Conceptually, neoclassical and Marxist 
theories are built from the bottom up, deriving accumulation from the under­
lying process of production. The institutionalist view, on the other hand, is 
constructed from the top down, with production subjugated to accumulation. 
The troubled history of capital theory suggests that bottom-up explanations are 
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logically vulnerable if not impossible. The top-down view, although largely unex­
plored, is unlikely to face the same problems. Indeed, by focusing directly .on 
power and on the way it shapes societal reproduction, this foute not only 
bypasses the intractable 'input-output structure' of industry, but also «idlers a 
way of integrating politics into our very conceptualization of capital. 
The IDaterial basis of capital 
Despite their pivotal significance, the definition of capital and the meaning of 
accumulation have remained unsettled (Schumpeter 1 954: 322-327, 625-645; 
Braudel 1982: 232-249). Historically, the principal contention stemmed from 
trying to marry two different perceptions of capital: one as an income generating 
fund, or 'financial wealth', the other as a stock of physical instruments, or 
'capital goods' (pasinetti and Scazzieri 1 987). The central question has been 
whether and in what way 'capital goods' are productive, and how their produc­
tivity affects their overall magnitude as 'capital' (Hennings 1 987). Mains.tream 
economics has generally tried to show that capita,! goods were indeed productive, 
and that this 'positive' attribute is what made .capital as a 'fund' valuable. 
The marriage did not work well, partly due to a large age difference: the 
concept of 'capital' predates that of 'capital goods' by a few thousand years, 
suggesting their overlap is not that self-evident. The older par-mer, capital, comes 
from the Latin caput, a word whose origin goes back to the 'Fertile Crescent. In 
both Rome and Mesopotamia capital had a similar, .unambiguous economic 
meaning: it was a monetary magnitude. There was no relation to produced 
'means of production'. Indeed, caput meant 'head', which fits well with another 
Babylonian invention, the human 'work day' (Bickerman 1972: 58, 63; 
Schumpeter 1954: 322-323). 
The younger partner, 'capital goods', was born millennia later, ,roughly 
together with capitalism. The growing significance of mechanized instruments 
captured the attention of pre-classical writers, but initially they referred t:o these 
mostly as 'stocks' (Barbon 1690; Hume 1 752). The Physiocrats were the first to 
give 'capital' a productive role, and it was only wi,th Quesnay and Turgot during 
the latter half of the eighteenth century, that the association between 'capitals' 
(as monetary advances) and mechanized production started to take shape 
(Hennings 1 987). 
Attempts to link capital and capital goods began in earnest with the classical 
writers, and from Adam Smith onward the productive attributes of capital have 
fUlally assumed centre-stage. The classical economists did not have a complete 
theory of capital, however. They tended to treat the ama:lgamate of 'capital 
goods' as a 'fund' or 'advance', whose principal role was to 'assist' the original 
factors of production - labour and land Although the general view was that 
capital goods were valuable due to their productivity, no attempt was made to 
quantify their 'amount'. The link between capital goods and capital was there­
fore left unspecified. In hindsight, the principal obstacle was that the classicists 
still viewed capital goods as a 'secondary' input, and in that sense qualitativelY 
70 Jonathan Nztzan and Shimshon Bichler 
clifferent from the ori,Sinal 'primary' inputs. This proved no more than a tempo­
rary roadblock, however. 
Taking the classical lead but without its associated inhibitions, the neoclassi­
cists followed Lauderdale (1 804), making capital goods a fully 'independent' 
factor of production, on a par with labour and land. Their view of capital, artic­
ulated since the latter part of the nineteenth century by writers such as 
Wicksteed, Marshall, Menger and primarily Clark, emphasised the distinct 
productivity of capital goods, elevating them from mere accessories to requisites. 
In his book The Distribution if wealth ( 1899), Clark used this newly-found 
symmetry among the factors of production to offer an alternative theory of 
distribution. The theory stipulated a direct mathematical link between income 
and production, based on two principal assertions. One was that output was a 
function of quantifiable 'factors of production', each with its own distinct 
productive contribution. This assumed that labour, land and capital were observ­
able and measurable (so for instance, we can see that production uses 20, 1 0  and 
IS units of each factor, respectively); that the way these factors interacted with 
one another in production was similarly straightforward (so we know exactly 
what factors enter the production process and how they affect all others factors); 
and that we can associate definite portions of the output with each of the factors 
(for instance, labour contributed 40 per cent, land I S  and capital goods 45). The 
second assertion was that the income of these factors was proportionate to their 
contributions, and more precisely, to their marginal contributions (so that the 
wage rate is equal to the productive contribution of the last worker added to 
production, the rent is equal to the contribution of the last hector of land, and 
the profit rate is equivalent to the contribution of the last unit of capital). 
Formulated at a critical historical junction, the new theory provided a 
powerful justification as well as explanation. The need for such a theory became 
apparent during the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the emergence of 
US 'big business' accelerated the centralization of capital, raised profit margins 
and heightened income inequality, much along the lines anticipated by Karl 
Marx. These new circumstances made earlier profit theories - for instance those 
based on 'abstinence' (Senior 1 872), or on 'waiting' (Marshall 1 920, first 
published in 1 890) - look hopelessly irrelevant. According to these earlier theo­
ries, capitalists who invested their money were abstaining from current 
consumption, and therefore had to be remunerated for the time they waited until 
their investment matured. Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, the huge 
incomes of corporate magnates such as Rockefeller or Morgan enabled them to 
consume conspicuously regardless of how much they invested. Moreover, when 
these magnates chose to be frugal, the reason was usually power, not delayed 
consumption. Clearly, there was a pressing need for a more robust ideology, and 
this is where Clark's theory of marginal productivity came into the picture. 
Contrary to the Marxist claim, Clark insisted that capital was not in the least 
parasitic: much like labour, it too received its own marginal productivity, an 
income which was therefore essential for the growth process. The marginal 
productivity theory enabled neoclassicists to finally remove their classical 
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shackles. The classicists, whether radical or liberal, were interested primarily in 
well-being and distribution. Production was merely a means toward those higher 
ends. Clark helped reverse this order, making distribution a corollary of produc­
tion. And indeed, since the turn of the century, attention gradually shifted from 
the causes of income inequality to its ramifications, a subject economists felt 
could be safely delegated to sociologists and political scientists. With so much 
going for it, the marginal productivity theory was rapidly endorsed by profes­
sional economists and, of course, by their 'captains of fmance'. Rockefeller, who 
donated $45 million to the University of Chicago where Clark taught, later 
stated 'it was the best investment I ever made' (Collier and Horowitz 1 976: 50). 
SOIDe very unsettling questions 
Clark's logical foundations, though, were hardly solid. One central problem, 
identified already by Wicksell (1 935: 149), was the 'quantity' of capital. In the 
real world, capital was usually associated with numerous capital goods. Unlike 
labour and land, however, these were heteroglmeous, and therefore could not be 
aggregated in terms of their own 'natural' units. I The only way to 'add' a 
machine producing aircraft parts to one making shoes, to another making 
biscuits, is by summing their values measured in money. The money value of any 
capital g60d - that is, the amount investors are willing to pay for it - is the 
present value of its expected future profit (computed by discounting this profit by 
the prevailing rate of interest, so Value = Expected prqfit / Rate if interest). Now, as 
long as our purpose is merely to measure the money value of capital, this 
method is hardly problematic, and is indeed used regularly by investors around 
the world. The difficulty begins when we interpret such value as equivalent to 
the 'physical' quantity of capital. To see why, suppose that the rate of interest is 
5 per cent, and that a given machine is expected to yield $ 1  million in profit year 
after year. Based on the principle of present value, the machine should be worth 
$20 million (= $ 1  million / 0.05). But what if expected profit were to go up to 
$ 1 .2 million? The present value should rise to $24 million (= $ 1 .2 million / 
0.05), but that would' imply that the very same machine can have more than one 
quantity! Clark's productivity theory of distribution was therefore based on a 
circular notion of capital: the magnitude of profit was explained by the marginal 
productivity of a given quantity of capital, but that quantity was itself a function 
of profit, which the theory was supposed to explain in the first place! Another, 
perhaps more substantive 'social' challenge to the concept of physical capital 
came from Veblen, to which we turn later. Yet, for almost half a century Clark's 
theory remained resilient, and it was only during the 1 950s that the early criti­
cism against it began to echo. 
The first shots were fired by Robinson (1953-4) and Champernowne 
(1953-4), followed by the publication of Sraffa's seminal work The Production if 
Commodities by Means if Commodities (1 960). Sraffa showed unequivocally that the 
'quantity of capital' was a fiction, and that productive contributions could not be 
measured without prior knowledge of prices and distribution (which the theory 
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was supposed to explain). Now, because capital goods were heterogeneous, 
neoclassicists were never able to dIrectly aggregate them into capital. This aggre­
gate could none the less be 'quantified', they argued, if only indirecdy, by looking 
at the rate of interest. The logic was simple: the higher the rate of interest, the 
more expensive capital becomes relative to labour, and hence the less of it will be 
employed relative to labour. According to this view, the 'capital intensity' of any 
productive process, defined as the ratio between the quantity of capital and the 
quantity of labour, should be negatively related to the rate of interest: the higher 
the rate of interest, the lower the intensity of capital. Of course, the relationship 
must be unique, with each 'capital intensity' associated with one and only one rate 
of interest. Otherwise, we end with the same capital having more than one 
'quantity'. But then that is exacdy what Sraffa found . . .  
His famous 'reswitching' examples demonstrated that, contrary to neoclassical 
theory, 'capital intensity' need not have a one-to-one relationship with the rate of 
interest. For instance, consider an economy with two technologies: process X which 
is capital intensive and process Ywhich is labour intensive (i.e., less capital inten­
sive). A rise in the rate of interest makes capital expensive relative to labour, and 
according to neoclassical theory should cause capitalists to shift production from X 
to 1'". As Sraffa showed, however, if the rate of interest goes on rising, it is entirely 
possible - indeed most likely - that process Y will once again become the more 
cosdy, causing capitalists to 'reswitch' back to X. This creates a logical contradic­
tion, since if we accept the rate of interest as a proxy for capital intensity, X appears 
to be both capital intensive (at a low rate of interest) and labour intensive (at a high 
rate of interest). In other words, the same assortment of capital goods represents 
different 'quantities' of capital . . . .  The result of Sraffa's work was not only to leave 
profit in search of explanation, but also to rob capital goods, the basis of so much 
theorizing, of any fixed magnitude. 
These writings marked the beginning of the famous 'Cambridge Controversy', 
a heated debate between Cambridge, England, where Robinson and Sraffa 
taught, and Cambridge, Massachusetts in the USA, the home of many neoclas­
sical economists (the controversy is summarized in Harcourt 1 969, 1972). 
Eventually, the neoclassicists, led by towering figures such as Nobel Laureate 
Paul Samuelson, conceded there was a problem, offering to treat Clark's neoclas­
sical defmition of capital not literally, but as a 'parable' (Samuelson 1 962). A few 
years later, Ferguson, another leading neoclassicist, admitted that because 
neoclassical theory depended on 'the "thing" called capital' ( 1 969: 25 1), accepting 
that theory in light of the Cambridge Controversy was therefore a 'matter of 
faith' (1 969: xvii-xviii). 
Yet faith was hardly enough. The fact that capital did not have a fixed 'phys­
ical' quantity set off a logical chain reaction with devastating consequences for 
neoclassical theory. It began by destroying the notion of a production function 
which, as noted above, required that all inputs, including capital, have measur­
able quantities. This in turn nullified the neoclassical supply function, which was 
built on the basis of such production function. And with the supply function 
gone, the notion of equilibrium - the intersection between supply and demand -
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was similarly made irrelevant. The implication was nothing short of dramatic, 
for without equilibrium, neoclassical economics failed its two basic tasks of 
explaining prices and quantities. 
Clearly, this was no laughing matter. For neoclassical theory to hold, the belief 
that capital was a material thing, a well-defined physical quantity with its own 
intrinsic productivity, had to be retained at all cost. The frrst and most common 
solution was to gloss the problem over, or ignore it altogether, and as Robinson 
( 1971) predicted and Hodgson (1 997) confrrmed, so far this seems to be working. 
Indeed, most economics textbooks (including Samuelson's!) continue to 
'measure' capital as if the Cambridge Controversy never happened. A more 
subtle method was to argue that the problem of quantifYing capital, however 
serious in principle, was of limited importance in practice (Ferguson 1 969). 
Given the abstract nature of neoclassical theory, though, resting its defence on 
relevance is hardly persuasive. The third and probably most significant response 
was to embrace disaggregate general equilibrium models. These latter models 
try to describe - analytically, that is - every aspect of the economic system, down 
to the smallest detail. The production function in such models separately speci­
fies each individual input, so the need to aggregate capital goods into capital 
does not arise in the first place. General equilibrium models have serious theoret­
ical and empirical weaknesses.2 Their most important problem, though, comes 
not from what they try to explain, but from what they ignore, and that is capital. 
While the 'shell' called capital may or may not consist of individual physical 
inputs, its existence and social significance are hardly in doubt. By ignoring this 
pivotal concept, general equilibrium turns itself into a hollow formality.3 
Of course, ignoring problems does not solve them. This is evident most 
vividly in empirical neoclassical studies, where production functions are used to 
explain changes in output. The results of such studies are usually highly disap­
pointing, in that only part of the output - and often only a small part - is 
explained by the 'observed' inputs, leaving a sizeable 'residual' hanging in the air. 
As we elaborate later in this chapter, one possible reason for this failure is that 
production is a holistic process, and hence cannot be made a 'function' of indi­
vidual inputs in the fu:st place. Neoclassical economists reject this possibility. 
Instead, they prefer to circumvent the problem by separating inputs into two 
categories - those which can be observed, namely labour, land and capital, and 
those which cannot, lumped together as technology. This by-pass, suggested by 
Marshall (1920) and popularized by Galbraith (1 958, 1967), enables mainstream 
economists to argue that the output 'residual' of empirical production functions 
is not a theoretical embarrassment, but simply a 'measure of our ignorance'. 
The problem, they say, is that we do not know how to 'measure' technology. Had 
we known, and had we incorporated the 'quantity' of technology into the 
production function, the 'residual' would have most surely disappeared. 
Unfortunately, this argument is only too convenient in that it can never be veri­
fied! Theories that claim to explain reality should be tested on how well they do 
so - the smaller their 'error' the more convincing the theory. Here, however, the 
problem is not the theory but the facts, so the error does not matter . . .  4 
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Neoclassical the� remains an edifice built on foundations of sand. The most 
questionable of these foundations is the notion that capital is a measurable entity, 
denominated in some 'physical' units and possessing its own intrinsic produc­
tivity. In fact, capital fulfils none of these requirements. The result is that the 
theory is unable to convincingly explain not only the structure of prices and 
production, but also the distribution of income which supposedly results from 
such structure. 
The Marxist entangleD1ent 
Throughout Dar Kapital there is no 'analytical' definition of capital, perhaps for a 
good reason. In contrast to classical theory, Marx saw capital not as a 'thing', but 
as a comprehensive social relation whose description was intertwined with its 
explanation. The context of capital included the production process, the division 
of labour, technological progress and, above all, the institutional and power 
arrangements shaping the collective consciousness. According to Wright ( 1977: 
1 98), the notion that capital accumulation involves merely the tangible augmen­
tation of machinery, buildings, raw materials and alike is alien to Marxist 
thinking. Instead, he maintains, 'capital accumulation must be understood as the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations on an ever-expanding scale through the 
conversion of surplus value into new constant and variable capital'. Emphasising 
this aspect of Marx's writing, Shaikh (1 990: 73) similarly reiterates that 'capital is 
not a thing, but rather a definite set of social relations', and that in order to 
understand it, 'one must therefore decipher its character as a social relation'. 
Marx started with three fundamental principles. The first was that human 
history was driven largely by a struggle over economic surplus. The second was 
that production and redistribution were inseparable: surplus presupposed a class 
society, whereas classes meant a struggle over how this surplus was created and 
who was going to get it. The third principle was that, regardless of its particular 
form, surplus was always generated through the labour process. The analysis of 
every class society therefore had to begin with the underlying process of produc­
tion. This latter conviction created the infamous 'materialistic' bias underlying 
Marx's theory of accumulation. 
The consequence of this bias was over-preoccupation with contents, less 
attention to form. The content of capitalism is the technological fusion of 
workers and instruments through an ever expanding process of production and 
consumption. The form of capitalism is capitalist control, that is, the manipula­
tion of human beings via the abstract accumulation of ownership titles. Marx 
repeatedly emphasized the interdependence of the two; he nevertheless failed to 
integrate this interdependence into his anaf;ytical framework of accumulation. 
When it came to describing accumulation in abstract terms, his attention was 
focused almost solely on production, leaving the dynamics of power practically 
ignored. The result was that although Marx saw accumulation as an antagonistic 
social process, in the end his analysis got entangled in the same 'materialistic' 
trap confounding the neoclassicists. 
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The main difficulty; known as the 'Transformation Problem', arose in 
converting production values (conceptualized in labour time) into market prices 
(measured in dollars and cents). The conversion proceeded in two steps: one 
from labour values to production prices (which would prevail under hypothetical 
conditions of competition), and the other from production prices to market 
prices (as observed in our 'imperfect' reality). Both steps were mired in contro­
versy. In the first stage, Marx's value equation required the equalization of three 
ratios across the economy: the rate of profit (ratio of surplus value to the sum of 
constant and variable capital), the rate of exploitation (ratio of surplus value to 
variable capital) and the organic composition of capital (ratio of constant to vari­
able capital). Competitive forces were thought to equalize the first two, but there 
was no comparable force to equalize the third.5 The logical result was production 
prices which generally deviated (albeit predictably) from labour values. Starting 
from Marx himself, the history of Marxian economics is marked by attempts to 
resolve this problem while retaining the 'materialistic' assumption which created 
it in the first place. The inevitable consequence was to blur the meaning of accu­
mulation, which in turn placed the entire labour theory of value in doubt. 
Until the 1950s, discussion of the Transformation Problem was largely 
confined to Marxist circles. But then external attacks began to mount. In 1957, 
Samuelson showed that, mathematically at least, the Transformation Problem 
was simply a 'complicating detour'. Marx stipulated a two-stage analytical 
process, moving from the conditions of production, to values; to prices of 
productions. In fact, argued Samuelson, the process required only one step, 
without any intermediate resort to values. 'Marxolaters, to use Shaw's term,' he 
suggested triumphantly, 'should heed the basic economic precept, valid in all 
societies, cut your losses' and dump the labour theory of value ( 1957: 89 1-892, 
cited in Howard and King 1 992: 242). 
And then came Sraffa's Production qf Commodities by Means qf Commodities. As 
noted earlier, the inunediate casualty was neoclassical capital theory, but that was 
just the beginning. Based on Sraffa's framework, it became apparent that 
Marxist theory too was vulnerable to inherent contradictions, going far beyond 
Samuelson's redundancies. As Steedman (1975, 1977) and others have shown, 
the value-price transformation was not only a complicating detour, but" generally 
an impossible detour. Once the analysis moves from elementary to joint produc­
tion processes - that is, to processes in which multiple inputs jointly produce 
multiple outputs - labour contents could be indeterminate, nil, even negative! 
Needless to say, numerous attempts were made to resolve these inconsistencies, 
but such solutions came at the cost of complicated formulas and restricting 
assumptions, further undermining the theory's overall appeal. 
In our view, the Marxist entanglement and neoclassical debacle share the 
same root, in that they both try to measure accumulation solelY on the basis of 
production. Marx (1867: 1 14) insightfully made the magnitude of value an 
expression of the 'portion of the total labour-time of society required to produce 
it'. His troubles began when, in line with the classical political economists before 
him, he too tried to build this totalftom the boftqm up - that is, on the basis of indi-
76 Jonathan .Nitza;n and Shimslwn Bichler 
vidual labour inputs. In this, Marx not only assumed that production contained 
the code of distribution and accumulation (which the post-Sraffa controversy put 
into question), but also that the production processes, including that of 'labour 
power', could be objectivefy identified in functional, quantitative terms. As it 
turned out, this was impossible not only in practice, but also in principle. 
Interestingly, Marx was remarkably prophetic in anticipating the demise of 
his own labour theory of value, and for this very reason. His insight is worth 
quoting at some length: 
As large-scale industry advances, the creation of real wealth depends less on 
the labour time and quantity of labour expended than on the power of the 
instrumentalities set in motion during the labour time . . . .  Human labour 
then no longer appears enclosed in the proc.ess of production - man rather 
relates himself to the process of production as supervisor and regulator . . . .  
He stands outside of the process of production instead of being the prin­
cipal agent in the process of production. In this transformation, the great 
pillar of production and wealth is no longer the immediate labour 
performed by man himself, nor his labour time, but the appropriation of his 
own universal productivity, i.e., his knowledge and his mastery of nature through his 
societal existence - in one word, the development of the societal individual . . . . As 
soon as human labour, in its immediate form, has ceased to be the great 
source of wealth, labour time will cease, and must of necessity cease to be 
the measure of wealth, and the exchange value must of necessity cease to be 
the measure of use value . . .. The mode of production which rests on the 
exchange value thus collapses. 
(Grundrisse tier Kritik tier politischen Okonomie: 592f., trans. from the German by 
Marcuse 1964: 35-6, emphases added) 
This intriguing idea is typical of Marx's search for inherent contradictions: the very 
development of the forces of production was set to Wldermine capitalism. In a 
complex socio-technological setting, he argued, the direct relationship between 
labour inputs and final prices was bOWld to break down. When that happens, price 
. setting becomes increasingly arbitrary, capitalists lose their moral conviction, and 
with their sense of hegemony seriously Wldermined, their system can no longer be 
sustained. Marx was of course proven wrong in believing that the demise of his own 
theory would bring capitalism down. Perhaps, contrary to his conviction, labour 
values. were not a pre-requisite for a functioning capitalism in the first place. His 
insight into the societal nature of production, however, and into the insurmount­
able problems this created for political economy, was prescient. 
The difficulty is simple: if production cannot be mapped from the bottom 
up, neither can distribution ind accumulation. Clearly something is missing 
from the story of capital, and that something is power. This neglect of power, 
perhaps more than anything else, is the reason why production-based theories of 
capitalism fW1 into the wall. Indeed, even if we ignore the first phase of the 
Transformation Problem, there remains the second step of transforming prices 
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of production into final market prices. The main difficulty here is the necessity of 
perfect competition (Howard and King 1 992: 282; Sweezy 1 942: 270-274). 
Specifically, firms and workers must be 'price takers' (unable to individually 
affect prices and wages), otherwise market prices need not be proportionate to 
production prices. Moreover, capital and labour must be able to move freely 
between industries, since this is the process by which the rates of profit and 
exploitation equalize across the economy. 
Yet these conditions of perfect competition do not exist in reality. Indeed, one 
could argue that such competition is alien to the very idea of a class society. If 
instead of competition we recognize the myriad of restrictive institutions such as 
monopolies and oligopolies, redistribution by government, dual labour markets, 
core and periphery interactions and so on, labour values become practically useless 
for the study of prices and accumulation. In fact, under non-competitive condi­
tions, with the wage rate deviating from the worker's 'socially necessary' cost of 
reproduction, the value of labour power itself - the basic input in all production 
processes - is already 'contaminated' by power relations. (paradoxically, Marx was 
the first to predict these deviations from competition, particularly the process of 
capital centralization and the growth of state power, although he did not explore 
their detrimental implications for his own labour theory of value.) 
The problem of all production-based theories of accumulation - be they 
neoclassicist or Mancist - is well reflected in their inability to clearly define what 
is being accumulated. The implicit assumption is that accumulation could somehow 
be measured in material terms. In the neoclassical world, where the goal is 'well­
being', capital is presumably reducible to some units of pleasure, or 'utils' as the 
neoclassicists fondly call them. Marxists see the capitalist as driven by the 
circular goal of accumulation for the sake of accumulation, a principle best 
understood in terms of power. Their analytical category of capital, however, is 
measured in terms of 'dead labour', and therefore remains overly entangled in 
the material intricacies of production. 
Institutionalist critique and reconstruction6 
Is there a solution? Does this solution involve the recognition of power as a 
central axis of analysis? And if so, can power be put into the very definition of 
capital? The answer requires that we re-examine the fundamental relationship 
between production and distribution. Most economists, while recognizing the 
growing complexity of production, refuse to accept its implications for distribu­
tion which they continue to link to productivity. The earliest and most notable 
exception was Thorstein Veblen, whose writing coincided with the emergence of 
large-scale industry and big business in the USA (cf. 1 898, 1 899, 1 904, 1 908a, 
1908b, 1 908c, 1 908d, 1 909, 1923). In contrast to the neoclassicists who built 
their theory on factor productivity, and to the Marxists who rested it on labour 
productivity, Veblen began where Marx ended, emphasizing societal productivity. 
A theory of mature capitalism, argued Veblen, must begin from the viewpoint 
of its principal actor, the businessman. The emergence of large-scale production 
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since the latter part of the nineteenth century, he maintained, has removed capi­
talists from the immediate realm of production, turning them into 'absentee 
owners'. Contrary to the earlier 'captain of industry' who both owned . and 
supeIVised production, the modem businessman was a 'captain of finance', an 
absentee owner whose activities and interests focused not on production but on 
the investment of funds. For the absentee investor, capital is finance and on(y 
finance. It represents neither tangible means of production, nor intangible 
knowledge, but rather the present value of expected future profit. The key to 
accumulation lies in what makes such profit grow, and according to Veblen this 
has to do not with production, but with the control of production. From this 
perspective, capital incorporates power as well as productivity. 
Veblen's starting point was a fundamental distinction between 'industry' and 
'business'. By industry he meant the entire societal process of production. This 
process comprised the whole fabric of human knowledge, including the sciences, 
technology and the underlying cultural traits which together - and on(y together ­
made human endeavour productive. Veblen rejected at the outset not only the 
notion of factor productivity entertained by the neoclassicists (which indeed no 
one has thus far been able to observe), but also the very existence of individual 
factors of production. Productivity, he argued, was an attribute of society as a 
whole, a feature of 'industry at large'. Machines, raw materials or human 
muscles were productive only as repositories of societal knowledge. Without such 
knowledge, they were merely non-economic objects. 
The most important implication was that distribution was necessarily political 
in the wider sense of the term. Since individual factors of production did not 
exist to begin with, they could not possibly be used to explain the income of 
different social groups. The secret of distribution lay outside industry. And indeed, 
under capitalism, industry was controlled by 'business', which for Veblen 
comprised the institution of absentee ownership and the political context in 
which such ownership was embedded. The goal of business was profit, an undif­
ferentiated claim on the income generated by industry at large. But since 
business and industry were distinct spheres to begin with, such profit could be 
secured only insofar as the former limited, or threatened to limit, the free func­
tioning of the latter: 
Plainly, ownership would be nothing better than an idle gesture without this 
legal right of sabotage. Without the power of discretionary idleness, without 
the right to keep the work out of the hands of the workmen and the product 
out of the market, investment and business enterprise would cease. This is the larger 
meaning of the Security of Property. 
(Veblen 1 923: 66-67, italics added) 
The essential contrast, then, is between an industrial realm whose functioning 
depends on integration, coordination and cooperation, and a business sphere 
which thrives on antagonistic power. It is the control of the former by the latter 
which determines, albeit pervertedly, how income is distributed. 
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From a Veblenian perspective, profit (including interest) is a nonlinear fimc­
tion of production. This is illustrated in Figure 5. 1 ,  which depicts the utilization 
of industrial capacity on the horizontal axis against the capital share of income 
on the vertical axis. Up to a point, the two go together. After that point, the rela­
tionship turns negative. The reason is easy to see by looking at extremes. If 
industry came to a complete standstill, profit would be nil (bottom left point in 
Figure 5. 1). But profit would also be zero if industry always and everywhere 
operated at full socio-technological capacity (bottom right point). The reason is 
that under this latter scenario, industrial considerations rather than business 
decisions would be paramount, production would no longer need the consent of 
owners, and these would then be unable to extract their tribute profit. 
In a capitalist society; 'business as usual' means oscillating between these two 
hypothetical extremes, with absentee owners limiting industrial activity to a 
greater or lesser extent. This limitation is what Veblen called 'sabotage'. When 
business sabotage becomes excessive, pushing output toward the zero mark, the 
result is recession and low profit. When sabotage grows too loose, industry 
expands toward it societal potential, but that too is not good for business, since 
loss of control means 'glut' and falling profit. For owners of capital, the ideal 
condition, indicated by the shaded arc in Figure 5. 1 ,  lies somewhere in the 
middle, with high profits being earned in. return for letting industry operate, 
though onfy at less than fill potential. Achieving this 'optimal' point requires 
Figure 5.1 Business and industry 
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Goldilocks tactics, neither 'too warm' nor 'too cold'. In the sardonic language of 
Veblen, it calls for th� strategic limitation of industry through a 'conscious with­
drawal of efficiency'. 
This theoretical relationshlp receives an astounding empirical confirmation 
from the recent history of the USA, depicted in Figure 5.2. The chart contrasts 
'business', measured by the income share of capital on the vertical axis, with 
'industry', measured by the rate of unemployment on the horizontal axis 
(inverted). The data clearly show the negative effect on business of both 'exces­
sive' industrial sabotage until the early 1 940s, as well as of 'insufficient' sabotage 
during WWII. 'Business as usual' was restored only after the war, with growing 
industrial limitations helping capitalists move up and to the left on the chart, 
toward their 'optimal' income share. 
The nature, methods and implications of such limitations are inherently polit­
ical. Indeed, as capitalism matures, business enterprise comes to incorporate not 
only private ownership and market exchange, but also larger parts of the legal, 
customary and ideological codes of conduct, as well as of the institutions and 
organizations which, taken together, comprise what we call the 'state'. Business 
limitations rely heavily on tactics such as the manipulation of 'wants', collusion, 
the erection of entry barriers, or the threat of dumping, but these are only part 
of a wider picture. Under modern capitalism, the control of industry also 
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involves - indeed necessitates - a wider set of institutions and actions such as 
government policies, legal protection for property rights, education and condi­
tioning, policing, bilateral and multilateral international institutions, and the 
occasional use of military force, to name only a few. Capital, understood as the 
power to control societal production for business ends, cannot exist outside this wider 
political context. 
The institution of absentee ownership, and the notion that profit and accumula­
tion derive from business limiting industry, suggest that all capital is intrinsicalf,y 
unproductive. This view contrasts sharply with Marx's 'fraction' taxonomy, which 
differentiates productive from unproductive capitals. According to Marx, capital 
accumulates through a circulation scheme, M-G--P-P'-C'-M'ONI], where finan­
cial capital (money M), turns into commercial capital (commodities C), to be made 
into industrial capital (work in progress, or productive capital P), producing more 
industrial capital (P' ), converted again into commercial capital (more commodities 
C') and finally into financial capital (more money M'). Although the circulation of 
capital is a single process, during the nineteenth century, each 'cycle' (namely, 
M-M, G--C and P-P) appeared dominated by a different group, or fraction of the 
capitalist class. Of these, the industrial fraction was deemed productive, the 'engine' 
of value and surplus value. The financial and commercial fractions, on the other 
hand, were seen as largely unproductive, deriving their profit through an intra­
capitalist redistributional struggle. There are two serious problems with this view. 
The first, theoretical problem, concerns the very link between circulation and 
accumulation. Marx's circulation scheme describes accumulation in backward­
woking terms. Profit is earned as a consequence of production, making accumulation 
the end of the process, to be measured in units of 'dead labour'. Absentee owner­
ship reversed this order, turning accumulation into aforward-looking process. The 
value of a corporation, measured by its capitalization on the bond and stock 
markets, reflects not its past profit and interest, but what it is expected to earn in 
the foture. This means that accumulation takes place before, not after 
production.7 The forward-looking nature of the process is highly significant, 
since it severs the link between accumulation and circulation. Contrary to Marx's 
scheme, the corporation� capital in fact never gets into 'circulation' in the first 
place. Indeed, being merely a symbolic valuation, a present value of future earn­
ings, it cannot be circulated. What gets circulated are the resources the firm has at 
its disposal - money, raw materials, semi-finished goods and depreciated 
machinery and structures - but the value of these resources is generally unre­
lated to the corporation's outstanding capitalization. This creates a problem, for 
with capital delinked from circulation, how could its fractions, embedded as they 
are in such circulation, be identified? 
The second problem is historical. It arises because absentee ownership 
enables even small investors to achieve extensive diversification, which in turn 
makes the various 'fractions' difficult to pin down. For example, how are we to 
classify conglomerates such as General Electric, DaimlerChrysler, or Philip Morris, 
which operate in hundreds of different sectors across the entire spectrum from 
finance, through raw materials, to trade, production, entertainment, advertising 
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and distribution? Mo�over, diversification has practically broken the functional 
connection between profit, which is reported by busiTUiSSfirms, and industrial clas­
sification which is based on the rype oj production (US Department of Commerce 
1 986: xiv). The result is that the very meaning of 'industrial', 'commercial' and 
'financial' profit is no longer clear. For instance, in the national accounts, 'manu­
facturing' profits denote the earnings of firms whose largest single line of 
business, measured in sales, is manufacturing. But if, as often is the case, manu­
facturing represents only a small part of such sales, the result is that the bulk of 
'manufacturing profit' in fact comes from lines of activity other than manzifacturing! 
And the problem does not go away even if we limit ourselves to an individual 
firm. The difficulty here is due to non-arm's-length, intra-firm transactions and 
'transfer pricing'. For example, if GE Capital subsidizes GE's jet-engine division 
by supplying it with cheap credit, the result is to lower profit in the former and 
raise in the latter, without any change in production and sales. All of this 
suggests that the fraction view cannot be treated as a universal feature of capi­
talism. It may have been useful during the pre-diversification phase, but is no 
longer adequate for the era of absentee ownership and conglomeration. 
All capital, including that which is formally associated with 'production', is 
inherendy unproductive. From an institutionalist perspective, the very classifica­
tion of capitals along lines of industrial activity, even in the absence of 
diversification and forward-looking capitalization, is misconceived. Production is 
always a societal activity, carried through the integrated realm of industry. General 
Motors does not produce cars. It controls the production of cars. But then so do 
firms such as Mitsubishi Trading and Deutsche Bank. Through different forms 
of power, each company controls key aspects of the production of cars, which in 
turn enable it to command part of the total societal profit. The way to differen­
tiate between firms, therefore, is not on the narrow basis of production, but 
along broader lines of power. 
Understood as a power institution, capital could be likened to a 'mega­
machine', somewhat along the lines suggested by Lewis Mumford ( 1967, 1 970). 
Tracing the long historical link between technology and power, Mumford argued 
that early machines were made not of physical matter, but of humans. In the 
great deltas of Egypt, Mesopotamia, China and India, the first feats of mecha­
nization were achieved through the formation of giant social organizations. The 
visible output of those early mega-machines were massive public works, such as 
palaces, citadels, canals, and pyramids. These, though, were largely means to an 
end. As Orwell put it, 'The object of power is power' ( 1949: 267), and indeed, 
according to Mumford, the true purpose of the ruling king and priests was the 
very assembly, operation and control of the mega-machine itself. 
Extending this concept to the contemporary business world, we can argue 
that the earlier elite association of kingship and priesthood has now been replaced 
by a coalition of capitalists and state officials, overseeing a new mega-machine 
named capital. The visible 'output' of this new mega-machine is profit, but that is 
merely a code of power. What is being accumulated is neither future utility nor dead 
labour, but abstract power claims on the entire process oj social reproduction. 
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Although driven by a similar quest for power, capital is qualitatively different 
from the ancient mega-machine. Older forms of power, for instance those insti­
tutionalized through bureaucracy, gender or race, are usually uni-dimensional 
and relatively inflexible. Capital, in contrast, is multi-dimensional and highly 
supple. There are four main reasons for this. 
First, the process of conunodification, when extended to capital, makes power 
itself vendible. Given that buying and selling capital is the very essence of invest­
ment, the result is not only to 'normalize' the expansion of power, but also to 
remove all intrinsic barriers on such expansion short of a world monopoly. 
Second, in contrast to other, socially unique codes of power, profit is 
measured in conunon monetary units and carries more or less the same power 
prerogatives all over the world. This universality makes the geographical expan­
sion of capital power far easier than that of other, more unique forms of power. 
Third, the focus on profit enables power to expand indirectly as well as 
directly. The ancient mega-machine was a relatively well-defined organization. 
Power was exercised over the organization itself and was therefore 'labour 
augmenting': to have more of it meant to have a larger organization. The capi­
talist mega-machine is much broader. It consists not of the corporation, but of 
the entire scope of capitalistic production. Capitalists struggle to control portions 
of this totality, with their success measured in terms of profit. Like their earlier 
counterparts, they could do so directly by making their corporate organization 
bigger in terms of employees. But they can also do it indirectly, by taising their 
profit per 'unit of organization', or profit per employee. In contrast to the 
ancient kings, therefore, capitalists could become 'lean and mean', expanding 
their power through smaller, 'labour-saving' organizations. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, any form of power which systematicallJ 
qfficts the foture flow of profit is automaticallJ capitalized (non-systematic effects are 
usually ignored by investors). In this way, male domination reducing the wages of 
women, environmental policies lowering the legal penalty for pollution, the use 
of military force affecting the price of raw materials, the impact of television on 
labour docility, the pacifying of indigenous populations through religious 
missionary, and so on, all have an impact on the flow of profit. Once 'system­
atized', they become facets of capital. 
Absentee owners exert their power over society. They measure it, however, 
relativelJ to other owners. Under modern conditions, capitalists are driven not to 
maximize profit, but to 'beat the average' and exceed the normal rate of return. 
This differential drive suggests a way to embed both production and power within 
the concept of accumulation (Nitzan 1 998). In a nutshell, conunand over profit, 
and hence capitalization, represent business power to limit societal production. 
Differential capitalization, the ratio of one's own capitalization to the average 
capitalization, therefore represents the relative social power of an owner. Finally, 
the rate of differential accumulation, the extent to which one's own capitaliza­
tion expands faster than the average rate of capitalization, measures the change 
in capitalist power. Achieving differential accumulation implies particular power 
to limit social production. 
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This differential nature of capitalist power is anchored in the need for exclu­
sion. In non-capitalist systems, exclusion is usually embedded in relatively rigid 
customs, such as those preventing serfs from growing into kings, slaves from 
tunring into masters, and untouchables from becoming Brahmins. Capitalism 
does not have similar customs. Commodilication makes upward mobility 
possible, and in principle there is nothing to prevent a son of a wandering 
vendor of quack medicine from assembling the Standard Oil of New Jersey, or a 
university dropout from starting Microsoft. This, though, does not imply that 
capitalism has done away with exclusion. Far from it. Indeed, fot John D. 
Rockefeller and William Gates to have acquired their own power, others had to 
give it up. Because of the constant threat of 'equal opportunity', such exclusion 
requires relentless formation and reformation of 'distributional coalitions', some­
what along the lines articulated by Olson ( 1965, 1982). The difference therefore 
is largely one of form: whereas in other power systems, exclusion is largely static, 
built into the social code and resulting in relatively stable groupings, under capi­
talism it must be 4Ynamically recreated, through ever-shifting alliances. 
The upshot is that the accumulation of capital in general depends on the accu­
mulation of capital at the centre. It is 'dominant capital', the large coalitions of big 
business and state institutions at the core of the process, which are crucial. The 
periphery of capital, the many capitals outside the core, are in fact a constant threat 
to the viability of capitalist development as a whole. Subject to the strong 
centrifugal forces of competition, their behaviour is forever undermining the collu­
sive essence of business 'sabotage', without which accumulation is impossible. Only 
to the extent that dominant capital is able to retain and augment its exclusive power 
against these other lesser capitals (existing or potential), keeping them 'out of the 
loop', can the capitalisation process be sustained. 
The institutionalist perspective allows us to see capital as a strategic concept 
whose essence is not production, but power over production. From this viewpoint, 
accumulation involves two inter-related processes. One is the progressive 
commodilication of social relationships, centred around the commodilication of 
power itself in the form of capital. In this sense, capital is a quantification of p()WCT'. 
The result not only makes capital the most flexible, dynamic and efficient form 
of power, but also enables it to incorporate other forms of power. The historical 
ascent of capital is manifested in the emergence of the 'normal rate of return' as 
a principal regulator of social relations. The belief that capital has, and should 
have, a 'natural' pace of expansion, now dominates the decisions not only of 
business people, but increasingly also of state officials and international institu­
tions. The ups and downs of this rate affect the flow of private capital and public 
funds, the employment or unemployment of resources, and the good or ill fate of 
entire nations. How this 'normal rate of return' comes into being, the way it 
spreads around the world, the reason for its fluctuations, and the impact it has on 
the lives of billions are perhaps some of the more important political-economic 
questions of our time. 
Part of the answer is undoubtedly routed in the second process of accumula­
tion, namely the centralization of corporate power. An orderly flow of profit is 
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contingent on the strategic limitation of industry by business, a process which 
was first normalized by the giant cOIporation, and which has since been 
sustained by ever more complex corporate alliances, backed by state institutions, 
organizations and policies. The 'normality' of profit in general, therefore, 
reflects the extent to which dominant capital has been able to consolidate, 
sustain and enhance its differential power to control and shape the process of 
societal reproduction for. its own advantage. 
Finally, it should be noted that capital is a ruling-class ideology par excellence. 
Its differential essence is inherently antagonistic, sexving those who own it largely 
by undermining those who do not. Indeed, even proponents of this ideology, 
from Adam Smith onwards, admit that the engine is the quest for profit, and that 
the bettering of human lives is merely an assumed consequence. Yet any 
ideology emphasizing prowess and control can never be truly universal. A theory 
of capital can tell us volumes about society as seen from above, but relatively 
little on the view from below. It can certainly not form a basis for universal 
emancipation. The current hegemony of capitalism is therefore necessarily 
partial, and in no way does it mark the beginning of the 'end of history'. 
Bringing capital into IPE 
How does all of this bear on international political economy? So far, much of 
the IPE literature has centred around the state. With the exception of a few 
writers, such as Cox ( 1987), Gill and Law ( 1989) and van der Pijl ( 1984, 1998), 
the general sentiment, echoed by Underhill in a recent IPE reader, is that 
'Understanding the state is in a way the problem of international political 
economy' ( 1994: 34-35, original italics). The purpose of IPE is usually expressed 
along two dimensions - to integrate politics and economics and to link the inter­
national with the domestic. These two dimensions, so it is argued, converge in 
the state, the principal theatre where the clash of human agency and social 
structure generates historical change. 
The institutionalist view opens an alternative route. Instead of associating 
states with 'politics' and capital with 'economics', it allows us to recognize both 
state and capital as power structures towering over the organization of societal 
production. Moreover, these two institutions do not simply stand against each 
other, but are rather intertwined in an evolving symbiosis. Historically, capital 
emerged from within the state, eventually growing to transcend it (transnational 
corporations such as DaimlerChrysler or BP-Amoco are not only larger than 
some developed economies, but can no longer be associated with a particular 
'parent' state). That has not made the state irrelevant, though. Indeed, capitalist 
power is impossible unless embedded in the wider political context created by 
states. From an institutionalist perspective, therefore, the central question of IPE 
should focus not on the state per se, but more specifically on the development of 
capital as an increasingly central moment of the state. Such 'capital-centred' IPE 
can evolve along numerous trajectories. The following briefly outlines several 
research agendas worth pursuing.a 
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The corporation 
How does capitalp';;wer get 'packaged' through leg;il incorporation? Why is it 
internalized and how is it quantified? What are the boundanes of 'dominant 
capital'? In what ways can dominant capital grow differentially, that is, relative to 
the average? Can we identify qualitatively different pa.ths, or 'regimes of differ­
ential accumulation'? What are the broader political-economic causes and 
consequences of each such regime? For instance, how do such regimes relate to 
the formal political process, the pace of economic groWth, or inflation? How and 
why does capital, an association of individual owners, 'spread' progressively from 
the corporation itself, through the industry, to the sector, to the nation-state, and 
now to the entire world? Is this progressive breakdown of 'barriers' necessary for 
the viability of dominant capital, and if so, what will happen once dominant 
capital becomes truly transnational with no further barrier to transcend? 
The state 
Against the ascent of capital, what are we to make of the state? How has its rela­
tionship with capital changed? How and to what extent do state and capital 
'overlap'? How has their 'symbiosis' changed over .time? For instance, could we 
see the state as being initially a 'cocoon' for capital, which is gradually shed off, 
or turned into a supporting limb? If the impact of a given state policy - for 
instance the effect on profit of military spending or intellectual property rights -
can be capitalized, what does that imply for the locus of power? How do we 
decide where this power resides? What aspects of capital power, if any, can exist 
without the support of state institution? Is the state necessary for accwnulation? 
IPE 
How has the multiplicity of states, with the associated layers of differential 
power, affected the formation and accumulation of transnational corporations? 
Could a global state play a similar role? What does this imply for the future of 
the nation-state and the inter-state system? In what way has the ascent of 
transnational firms shaped the structure and behaviour of states? Is there any 
discernible historical pattern here, and could it be theorized? Does the power 
essence of capital necessitate both universalization (globalization) and intercon­
nectedness (and thus separate states)? How has the changing interaction of 
capital and state power affected the formation of elites and dominant ideologies? 
Contradictions, ideology and hegenzony 
What are the points of conflict between the needs of capital to limit societal 
reproduction, and its position as a dominant ideology? How could capitalist 
ideology reconcile the conflicting drive for power by the few with the pursuit of 
Lakshmi by the many? Can an ideology of commodification and private prop-
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erty become universal in its own right? What additional, non-capitalist ingredi­
ents are necessary to build a hegemonic bloc around what neo-Gramscians call the 
'transnational capitalist class'? How can these extra-capitalist factors be sustained 
against capital's limitless quest for power? Can a truly transnational class exist in 
the absence of a global state? Does the emergence of such class mark the 
coming of a global state, and could this state paradoxically become the begin­
ning of the end of capital? 
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Notes 
Although labour and land are not homogeneous either, their heterogeneity is funda­
mentally different from that of capital goods. The quality of labour could be 
moulded through education, whereas land could be improved through cultivation. 
Capital goods, on the other hand, are not at all supple. Once made, they can rarely 
be converted for tasks other than those for which they were originally designed. 
2 First, the production theatre becomes infinitely complex, making identification and 
quantification impossible. Second, without aggregation some input complementarity 
is inevitable, so the corresponding marginal products caIU10t be derived, even on 
paper. Third, because rationality and utility maxinllzation alone do not guarantee 
downward-sloping excess demand functions, general equilibrium models need not be 
'stable' (Rizvi 1994). And fourth, the theory is inherently static, and hence can say 
little on the dynamic essence of accumulation. 
3 Aware of the inherent circularity of 'tangible' marginalism, the �ustrian' economists 
sought to circumvent the problem altogether by substituting time for capital goods. 
Following Jevons (187 1), who formulated his production function with time as an 
input, writers such as Bohm-Bawerk (1891), Wicksell (1935), and later Hicks (1973), 
reinterpreted capital goods as 'stages' of a temporal production process. Capital was 
counted in units of the 'average period of production', itself a combination of orig­
inal inputs and the time pattern of their employment. In general, it was believed that 
'roundabout' processes (which are longer, more mechanized and indirect) were more 
productive, and that 'lengthening the average period of production was therefore 
tantamount to raising its 'capital intensity'. The Austrian theory had two main draw­
backs. First, its emphasis on original inputs - to the exclusion of tangible capital 
goods - was dangerously close to the classicists and to Marx, something the neoclassi­
cists were more than eager to avoid. Second, its focus, including its link to the time 
preferences of consumers, remained exclusively materialistic. It tried to establish a 
positive relationship between an aggregate quantity of capital on the one hand, and 
productivity/utility on the other. Its route was therefore not that different from 
Clark's, and indeed it too fell into the 'reswitching' trap (see Hunt 1 992, ch. 16). 
4 Consider two hypothetical production functions, with physical inputs augmented by 
technology: (I) Q = 2N + 3L + 5K + T and (2) Q = 4N + 2L + 10K + 1; where Q 
denotes output, N labour, L land, K capital, and T 'technology'. Now, suppose Q is 
100, N is 10, L is 5 and K is 4. The implication is that T must be 45 in function (I) 
and 10 in function (2). Yet, since technology cannot be 'measured', we would never 
know which function is correct, so both can safely claim validity . . . . 
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5 The basic value equation is Value = c + v + s, with c being the value of constant 
capital, v the value of�ble capital and s denoting surplus value. The rate of profit 
is given by 1t = s I (c + v), the rate of exploitation by E = s / v and the organic 
composition of capital by 9 = c I v. Dividing both sides of the rate of profit equation 
by v we get 1t = (s / v) I (c / v + I) = (E) I (9 + I). Clearly, if 1t and E are equalized 
across the economy, so must 9. 
6 This section draws partly on Nitzan (1998). 
7 'Robber Barons' such as Cornelius Vanderbilt and Jay Gould were often accused of 
'watering' or 'diluting' their companies by issuing stocks whose value far exceeded 
their tangible property. But in so doing, they were in fact 'the innovators of modern 
corporate tactics: the capitalization according to earnings rather than in ratio to actual 
assets' Q"osephson 1934: 72, original emphasis). 
8 Some of these ideas are developed theoretically and empirically in Bichler and Nitzan 
(1996a and 1996b, 1999), Nitzan (1992, 1998, 1999) and Nitzan and Bichler (1995, 
1996, 1997). 
